

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MILITARY ANALYSIS
OF
THE REMOTE AND PROXIMATE CAUSES
OF
THE INDIAN REBELLION.

Jardner (L. R. W.)
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MILITARY ANALYSIS
OF
THE REMOTE AND PROXIMATE CAUSES
OF
THE INDIAN REBELLION,

DRAWN FROM

OFFICIAL PAPERS ON THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA:

**RESPECTFULLY ADDRESSED TO THE HONOURABLE THE MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.**

BY

GENERAL SIR ROBERT GARDINER, K.C.B.,
Royal Artillery.

SECOND EDITION.

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“ The trade of India being carried on by exclusive
“ Companies, becomes a monopoly against the very nation
“ that erects them.”—ADAM SMITH.

“ The faith of treaties is basely prostituted by studying
“ to couch them in vague or equivocal terms, to introduce
“ ambiguous expressions, to revive objects of dispute, to
“ over-reach those with whom we treat, and out-do them in
“ cunning and duplicity. Let the man who excels in these
“ acts boast of his happy talents, and esteem himself a keen
“ negociator ; but reason and the sacred law of nature will
“ class him as far beneath a vulgar cheat as the majesty of
“ kings is exalted above private persons.”—VATTEL.

“ Ce n'est pas tout que d'être civil ; il faut être aussi
“ raisonnable, et ne pas écorcher les gens.”—MOLIÈRE.

TO THE HONOURABLE
THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS.

GENTLEMEN,

I.
Introductory
Remarks.

THE following Notes were compiled and classed in their present form at the moment of our learning the outbreak of the revolt (then designated "a Military Mutiny") in India, with the purpose of investigating its military causes, and obtaining accurate professional data, in order to exemplify to the House of Commons the prejudicial and disastrous results of our legislative military policy in India, as I had previously done in the wars of the Peninsula and the Crimea.

May 2, 1857. A cursory view of the revolt in India was shortly after submitted by me to the notice of the House; but the data on which that document was drawn were withheld from the Press till Her Majesty's late Government announced the intended transfer of the government of

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India from the East India Company to the Crown.

It will be denied by few, I believe, that England cannot pretend to govern that vast Empire, comprising many warlike nations, but by military power.

Lord Metcalfe's views, with regard to our dominion of India, were based on military power; and as such authority must afford weight to any appeal to your attention, Gentlemen, I have coupled many of his officially recorded opinions on the Administrative Government of India, with the Notes professionally compiled in illustration of the evils of our general legislative military system. In this combined form, I respectfully submit them, Gentlemen, to your attention.

II.
Character of
past Govern-
ment in India.

The mistake of its original constitution, its incongruities, the plurality of its branches, each permitted to dispense some degree of patronage, and exercise some extent of power, with optional repudiation of responsibility, the opportunities afforded for abuse of power, while each department in itself was powerless to check abuse in others, were the early causes which led to the failure of the Government, and the rebellion of British India.

January 4,
1784.

The first indications of practical improvement in the government of India may be dated from the period of Mr. Pitt's entry into Parliament, when he took an early interest in its reform—reminding the House of Commons that, “the concerns of England in India, in the various considerations to which they branched; the Civil and Military Government; the Revenues; the Commerce; the vast territorial possessions, which, though they had been long acquired, had never yet been finally settled; that there were claims to be ascertained, and interests to be divided; the happiness of the natives was to be studied; the connection between the commerce of India and Europe was to be maintained; and, last of all, they

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“ were to consider what were likely to be the
 “ effects of the Government of India on the
 “ Government of Great Britain ; how it might
 “ affect our constitution in point of influence ;
 “ and how it might be rendered at once vigorous
 “ and unalarming.”

July 8, 1784. Since the passing of his second Indian Bill, all progress in the advancement of beneficial government in India has laid dormant, till England was awakened from her unsound state of security by the fearful revolt of the last year.

Adam Smith. The construction of the Indian Government was demonstrated by Mr. Pitt, shortly after his accession to office, to be constitutionally and practically unfit for its purpose ; and one of our admitted most able political economists, contemporarily, proved with him that naturally, legislatively, commercially, and morally, it was so.

Mr. Pitt, in developing the principles on which he proposed to frame the Government of India, indicated his objections to a commercial directory, while he advocated the constitutional propriety of ruling by a Minister of the Crown.

January, 1784. To that end, he proposed, “ that a Board
 “ should be instituted, to be appointed by the
 “ Sovereign, consisting of one of the principal
 “ Secretaries of State, the Chancellor of the

“ Exchequer for the time being, and a certain
“ number of the Privy Council.”

He argued, that, “ inasmuch as European
“ politics were become involved in the politics
“ of India, it was necessary that one executive
“ power should have the superintendence over
“ the whole empire.”

He deprecated the control of “ a junto, poli-
“ tically connected, established in a manner
“ independent of the Crown, by whom India
“ was to be converted into one vast political
“ engine against the independence of the
“ House.”

In adverting to the administrative powers of
the East India Directory, he considered it of first
consequence, “ that the Imperial dominion of
“ our territories in the East ought to be placed
“ under other control than that of the mer-
“ chants in Leadenhall Street.”

“ That the servants in India must obey the
“ controlling power at home; but still, in
“ regard to the distance from the controlling
“ power, care must be taken to use them with
“ such discretionary authority, as should leave
“ energy and vigour for all the purposes of good
“ and substantial government, sufficient to secure
“ the happiness of the natives, as well as to
“ protect the commerce and the possessions; but,
“ at the same time, so limited as to restrain

“ inordinate ambition—to crush oppressive rapacity—to extinguish the jobbing of adventure—and to establish true and equitable dominion.”

January 28,
1784.

July, 1784.

The Bill founded on these just and enlightened principles, and proposed with such beneficent purposes was, unfortunately for India and for England, thrown out by a small majority of eight ; and, though its objects were in some respects provided for by his Bill which passed later in the year, yet the adoption of his first proposed measures in their unmodified original integrity, might have averted the present existing revolt and advanced India far onwards in free commercial wealth, and in legislative and social enlightenment.

III.
Causes of
the Indian
Revolt.

We lose sight of the causes, in contemplating the horrors of the revolt, as we lose sight of the arduous work still before us, in the brilliancy of the unsurpassed recent achievements of our troops in India.

Edited by J.
W. Kaye,
Esq., 1855.

We owe the most open exposure on clear evidence of the causes of the Indian rebellion, to the official papers and correspondence of Lord Metcalfe, previous to, and during the period of his Government in India.

His comprehensive mind, long experience, and universally admitted great powers of statesmanship, fatally disregarded by the Commercial Government of India, will ever be held in remembrance as landmarks of wise, just, and beneficent government.

On the first perusal of Lord Metcalfe's official papers, it is impossible to allay the wonder excited by the long continued course of the faults and errors of Government which he exposed.

It has been imputed to Lord Metcalfe, that the faults and abuses of Government which he so perspicuously pointed out were left by him without any suggestion of remedy.

Let the invaluable lessons afforded in his legislative comments speak for themselves. I only

advert to the unfounded imputation to guard against its fallacious influence being made a cloak to screen the government faults and errors of others, who ought to have acted on his suggestions and corrected the evils he pointed out.

Since the revolt, a great deal has been said to keep the character and nature of our Indian Government out of sight. The persons who thus act, incur an awful responsibility in keeping up an unsound feeling and delusion as to our past Government of India. A delusion that can but render the sincerity of future obedience to British dominion, or even its outward semblance, of more precarious and protracted attainment.

The revolt in India has two characters; one a civil insurrection, the other a military mutiny, or, rather a mutiny of the native soldiery, merged in social rebellion; not having been provoked by military causes in itself, but instigated by influential emissaries of high power, with a view of exterminating the English race from India. There has certainly been mutiny in the native soldiery both frequent and extensive, but always provoked and fomented by injudicious acts affecting the army by the Indian Civil Government. The native army had been faithful in its engagements, obedient to its officers, and had discharged its military duties up to the moment when they were secretly led to believe by native

influential emissaries, that they were about to be betrayed. They had again and again given proofs of their loyalty by constancy to their colours in the heat of battle and in never failing defence of their wounded European officers against their native brethren opposed to them in arms. That they were naturally imbued with a latent instinctive feeling of the inward hatred generally borne to us by the native population, is made clear by the suddenness with which it was awakened and the vindictive fury with which it burst forth when worked on by the assigned causes and purport of an arranged projected rebellion. But it was no concerted dereliction of military duty among themselves that instigated them to take part in those dire horrors. India was roused to one universal feeling of oppressive subjection, and more or less universally determined to cast off our dominion ; and, under the influences of blind rage, and with most fell purpose, the combined social and military revolt burst upon us.

At a later period in these observations, an attempt will be made to show this apparent inconsistency of character in fuller light.

The military mutiny so called, broke out suddenly and simultaneously in different parts of India, and was to our commercial Government a surprise.

If the Government had taken past events into consideration, or had been capable of impartial judgment on the occasion, they would not have received either the social rebellion or its attendant military mutiny, as a surprise.

Doubtless the native army had on various previous occasions, manifested feelings of discontent and inclination to revolt.

The Duke of Wellington, in the early days of his service in India, discerned easily awakened feelings of this nature.

1824. The extensive and daring mutiny at Barrackpore cannot be forgotten.

Later, Sir Charles Napier, when Commander-in-Chief in India, prevented by masterly management and promptitude, a mutiny of twenty regiments, engaged in secret correspondence, preparatory to its outbreak.

And from what causes? From complaining of the troops against their officers? Relaxation of discipline? In an army commanded by Sir Charles Napier! No such thing. To entertain such a thought would be to reason on an impossibility. The fidelity, loyalty, military subordination, and bravery of the Sepoy army have

Parliamentary
Enquiry on
the Civil and
Military Go-
vernment of
India,
1852-3.

received the incontestable affirmation of the several British officers who have, at different periods, commanded the Indian army. Whenever insubordination or revolt was provoked, it

was by the injudicious interference of the Civil Government, in tampering with the pay and disputed stipulated allowances to the native army under contingent circumstances. The last instance of occurrence of this nature, was the mutiny suppressed by Sir Charles Napier in 1849-50, which may have shaken faith and confidence among the native troops in the Government of India; but military discontent or insubordination stand quite apart from the causes which provoked the rebellion of 1857. That event had its sources in remote and deeper causes and far wider reaching purposes than those of military mutiny.

Defects, Civil and Military, of the Indian Government. Edited by Sir W. Napier, 1857.

On a dispassionate inquiry, it will be found, that whatever antecedent evils may have resulted from the dominion of a commercial Government over a military empire like India, the proximate causes of the existing rebellion had their rise in our adoption of the long questioned policy of annexation. The annals of our Indian Government show that on its being first mooted the policy was opposed as untenable in principle. I will transcribe the opinions of highest authority on the subject, as quoted in a recent work of extensive research, as documents that stand out in clear light as evidence of the rebellion having had its exclusive source in the measures of Civil Government, and that the Indian

The Rebellion of India, by J. B. Norton, Esq., 1857.

army had no part in its first conception or its organization, though they subsequently were the executioners of its dreadful purposes.

The Duke of Wellington writes thus :—

“ In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and description of our enemies by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, particularly if we aggrandize ourselves at the expense of the Mahrattahs, we increase this evil; we throw out of employment and means of existence all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies: at the same time, by the addition of our territory, our means of supporting our Government and of defending ourselves are proportionally decreased.”

Sir Thomas Monro writes :—

“ Even if all India could be brought under the British dominion it is very questionable whether such a change, either as it regards the natives or ourselves, is to be desired. One effect of such a conquest would be that the Indian army, having no longer any warlike neighbours to combat, would, gradually, lose

“ its military habits and discipline, and, *for want*
 “ *of other employment, to turn it against their*
 “ *European masters.* But even if we could be
 “ secured against every internal commotion, and
 “ could retain the country quietly in subjection,
 “ I doubt much if the condition of the people
 “ would be better than under their native
 “ princes. The strength of the British Go-
 “ vernment enables it to put down every rebel-
 “ lion, to repel every foreign invasion, and to
 “ give to its subjects a degree of protection
 “ which those of no native power enjoy. Its
 “ laws and institutions also afford them a secu-
 “ rity from domestic oppression unknown to
 “ those states; *but these advantages are dearly*
 “ *bought. They are purchased by the sacrifice of*
 “ *independence, of national character, and of what-*
 “ *ever renders a people respectable.* The natives
 “ of the British provinces may, without fear,
 “ pursue their different occupations as traders,
 “ meerassadars, or husbandmen, and enjoy the
 “ fruits of their labour in tranquillity; but none
 “ of them can aspire to anything beyond this
 “ mere animal state of thriving in peace: none
 “ of them can look forward to any share in
 “ the legislation, or civil or military govern-
 “ ment, of their country. It is from men who
 “ either hold or who are eligible to public office
 “ that natives take their character: where no

“ such men exist, there can be no energy in
 “ any other class of the community. The effect
 “ of this state of things is observable in all
 “ the British provinces, whose inhabitants are
 “ certainly the most abject race in India. No
 “ elevation of character can be expected among
 “ men who, in the military lines, cannot attain
 “ to any rank above that of sabadar (captain),
 “ where they are as much below an (English)
 “ ensign as an ensign is below the commander-
 “ in-chief; and who, in the civil line, can hope
 “ for nothing beyond some petty judicial or
 “ revenue office, in which they may, by corrupt
 “ means, make up for their slender salary. The
 “ consequence, therefore, of the conquest of
 “ India by the British arms would be, in place
 “ of raising, to debase the whole people. There
 “ is, perhaps, no example of any conquest in
 “ which the natives have been so completely
 “ excluded from all share of the government
 “ of their country as British India. Above
 “ all the disorders of the native states, the field
 “ is open to every man to raise himself; and
 “ hence, among them, there is a spirit of emu-
 “ lation, of restless enterprise and independence,
 “ far preferable to the servility of our Indian
 “ subjects. The existence of independent native
 “ states is also useful in drawing off the turbulent
 “ and disaffected among our native troops.”

Sir John Malcolm writes:—

“ I am decidedly of opinion that the tranquillity, not to say the security of our vast oriental possessions is involved in the preservation of the native principalities which are dependent on us for protection. These are also so obviously at our mercy, so entirely within our grasp, that besides the other and great benefits which we derive from those alliances, their co-existence with our rule is of itself a source of *political strength, the value of which will never be known till it is lost*. They show the possibility of a native state subsisting even in the heart of our own territories, and their condition mitigates, in some degree, the bad effects of that too general impression that our sovereignty is incompatible with maintenance of native princes and chiefs. I am further convinced, that though our revenue may increase, the permanence of our power will be hazarded in proportion as the territories of native princes and chiefs fall under our direct rule. Considering, as I do, from all my experience, that it is now our policy to maintain as long as we can all native states now existing, and, through them, and by their means to support and maintain native chiefs, and an aristocracy throughout the empire of India, I do think that every means

“ should be used to avert what I should consider
 “ as one of the greatest calamities in a political
 “ point of view, that could arise to our empire,
 “ viz., the whole of India becoming subject to
 “ our direct rule. There are none of the chiefs
 “ who can venture to contend against us in the
 “ field. They are incapable, from their actual
 “ condition, of any dangerous combinations with
 “ each other, and they absorb many elements of
 “ sedition and rebellion. It is further to be ob-
 “ served on this part of the subject, that the
 “ respect which the natives give to men of high
 “ birth, with claim upon their allegiance, con-
 “ tributes greatly to the preservation of the
 “ general peace. Such afford an example to
 “ their countrymen of submission to the rule
 “ of foreigners. They check the rise of those
 “ bold military adventurers, with which India
 “ has, and ever will abound, but who will never
 “ have the field widely open to their enterprises,
 “ until our impolicy has annihilated, or suffered
 “ to die of their own act, those high princes and
 “ chiefs, who, though diminished in power, *have*
 “ *still the hereditary attachment and obedience of*
 “ *millions of those classes*, who are, from habit
 “ and courage, alike suited to maintain or to
 “ disturb the public peace.”

Sir Henry Russell writes :—

“ The danger that we have most to dread

“ in India, lies entirely at home. A well-con-
 “ ducted rebellion of our native subjects, or, an
 “ extensive disaffection of our native troops, is
 “ the event by which our power is most likely
 “ to be shaken ; and the sphere of this danger
 “ is necessarily enlarged, by every enlargement
 “ of our territory. The increase of our subjects,
 “ and still more of our native troops, is an in-
 “ crease, not of our strength, but of our weak-
 “ ness ; between them and us, there never can
 “ be continuity of feeling. We must always
 “ continue foreigners, and the objects of that
 “ jealousy and dislike, which a foreign rule
 “ never ceases to excite.”

Mr. Elphinstone writes :—

“ It appears to me, to be our interest, as
 “ well as our duty, to use every means to
 “ preserve the allied Governments ; it is also
 “ our interest to keep up the number of in-
 “ dependent powers ; their territories afford a
 “ refuge to all those, whose habits of war,
 “ intrigue, or depredation, make them inca-
 “ pable of remaining quiet in ours ; and the
 “ contrast of our Government has a favourable
 “ effect on our subjects, who, while they feel
 “ the evils they are actually exposed to, are
 “ apt to forget the greater ones from which
 “ they have been delivered. If the existence
 “ of independent powers gives occasional em-

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“ ployment to our armies, it is far from being
“ a disadvantage.”

Lord Ellenborough writes :—

“ Our Government is at the head of a system
“ composed of native states, and I would avoid
“ taking what are called rightful occasions of
“ appropriating the territories of native states ;
“ on the contrary, I should be disposed, as far
“ as I could, to maintain the native states ; and
“ I am satisfied that the maintenance of the
“ native states, and the giving to the subjects of
“ those states the conviction that they were
“ considered permanent parts of the general Go-
“ vernment of India, would materially strengthen
“ our authority. I feel satisfied that I never
“ stood so strong with my own army as when I
“ was surrounded by native princes—they like
“ to see respect shown to their native princes.
“ Those princes are sovereigns of one-third of
“ the population of Hindostan ; and with re-
“ ference to the future condition of the country
“ it becomes more important to give them con-
“ fidence that no systematic attempt will be
“ made to take advantage of the failures of
“ heirs to confiscate their property, or to injure,
“ in any respect, those sovereigns in the position
“ they at present occupy.”

Mr. Shepherd writes :—

“ Throughout the short period of the won-

“ derful rise of the British Power in India, our
 “ Government have adopted generally a system
 “ of decided conciliation towards the native
 “ princes, chiefs, and people. • The former were
 “ found the best instruments for conciliating
 “ towards us the good will of their subjects.
 “ We managed generally so to combine their
 “ interests with our own, that they soon per-
 “ ceived that the success of our Government
 “ proved the best source of benefit to themselves,
 “ and thus they became in a manner constituent
 “ elements of our system of government. The
 “ language of Mr. Elphinstone was, that the
 “ British Government was uniformly anxious to
 “ promote the prosperity of its adherents; it
 “ being a maxim of its policy that the interests
 “ of such persons should be as dear to it, as its
 “ own.

“ I attribute to this system the first and more
 “ early co-operation of the natives generally in
 “ our progress. A perseverance in the same
 “ course of moderation and forbearance, a cau-
 “ tious abstaining from interfering in the native
 “ religion, a scrupulous regard to the main-
 “ tenance of our honour and good faith, an
 “ impartial administration of justice, and, in
 “ fact, the general kind and benevolent treat-
 “ ment of all classes, did not fail to win the
 “ confidence of the people at large. An im-

“ mense native army, second to none in effi-
 “ ciency and discipline, and whose attachment
 “ and fidelity have stood the test of no ordinary
 “ temptations, has also been the fruits of this
 “ system. And, at length, we have the amazing
 “ spectacle of a vast country, consisting of
 “ six hundred thousand square miles, and con-
 “ taining upwards of one hundred million of
 “ inhabitants, governed through the medium of
 “ a handful of Englishmen.

“ May it not be fairly questioned, whether a
 “ system of universal conquest and assumption
 “ of territory would have been equally suc-
 “ cessful? And if so, whether it is prudent,
 “ even were it just, to deviate from this suc-
 “ cessful course? I am the last person to
 “ derogate from the importance of ‘British
 “ bayonets’ in India; without them, we would
 “ neither have gained nor retained our magni-
 “ ficent empire. I am, however, equally per-
 “ suaded that a bare dependence upon physical
 “ force, even in early or later times, although it
 “ might no doubt have maintained the security
 “ of our territories on the coast, and fully vin-
 “ dicated our national power; yet, under it,
 “ the civilising influences of the British rule
 “ could never have been extended, and the
 “ range of our cannon must have continued to
 “ be the boundaries of our territory.”

General Biggs writes :—

“ If you do away with the right of adoption
 “ with respect to the princes of India, the next
 “ question will be, whether in the case of estates
 “ which you yourselves have conferred on
 “ officers for their services, or upon other indivi-
 “ duals for their merits, they should be allowed
 “ to adopt. Here you are treading on delicate
 “ ground. If you are to do away with the right
 “ of individuals to adopt, you will shake the
 “ faith of the people of India ; you will influence
 “ that opinion which has hitherto maintained
 “ you in your power ; and that influence will
 “ thrill through your army ; and you will find,
 “ one day, as Lord Metcalfe more than once
 “ said, ‘ We shall rise some morning, and hear
 “ of a conflagration throughout the whole em-
 “ pire of India, such as a few Europeans among
 “ millions will not be able to extinguish.’ Your
 “ army is derived from the peasantry of the
 “ country, who have rights, and if these rights
 “ are infringed upon, you will no longer have
 “ to depend on the fidelity of that army. You
 “ have a native army of two hundred and fifty
 “ thousand men to support your power, and it
 “ is on the fidelity of that army your power
 “ rests. *But you may rely on it, if you infringe
 “ the institutions of the people of India, that army
 “ will sympathise with them ; for they are part of*

“ *the population* ; and, in every infringement you
 “ may make on the rights of individuals, you
 “ infringe upon the rights of men who are
 “ either themselves in the army, or upon their
 “ sons, their fathers, or their relatives. Let the
 “ fidelity of your army be shaken, and your
 “ power is gone.”

It is difficult to suppose how any pretensions to despotic annexation, extension of territory, evasion of treaties, dispute of the right of adoption, failing heirs in succession to hereditary princes, with similar interferences in the affairs of other states, could possibly be entertained in the face of these powerful and lucid illustrations of the international rights of states. They were, however, unfortunately and fatally disregarded by the Government of India.

Some insight to the subject will be afforded by the following notes on the annexation of Oude, which is represented to have been an object with the Indian Government of long contemplation.

Sir John
 Shore's 'Notes
 on Indian
 Affairs,' 1835.

“ The state of the kingdom of Oude has,
 “ during the last two years, excited considerable
 “ interest, and produced no small portion of
 “ discussion in the public prints. Like most
 “ others, it has had its day, and given way to
 “ succeeding topics of temporary interest, and
 “ possibly might have been forgotten altogether

“ for the time being, had not the attention of
 “ the public been again drawn to the subject by
 “ the recent instructions of the Court of Di-
 “ rectors empowering the local Government
 “ boldly to throw off the mask, dethrone the
 “ King of Oude, and annex his dominions to
 “ those of the East India Company. The mo-
 “ tives of the Court in issuing such orders are
 “ obvious enough—gain. Some time ago, an
 “ exchange was effected between the Saugor
 “ territories and Scindia of several small tracks
 “ of land, to the great benefit, considering the
 “ locality, of both Government and the people.
 “ The Court of Directors strongly disapproved
 “ of this; yet they sanction the seizure of Oude,
 “ in the face of existing treaties. Why? they
 “ gained nothing by the former; they hope to
 “ gain considerably by the latter.”

1848.

The annexation in effect took place in a few
 years from that period, and in the promulgation
 of the Governor-General's Punjab despatch to
 the Court of Directors, asserting the policy of
 annexation, and the affirmation of that policy,
 by the dethronement of the King of Oude, and
 the annexation of that kingdom with some other
 minor states to the dominion of England, we
 have proximately a key to the combined social
 and military rebellion, which had for its object
 the general massacre and extermination of the

English from India. From that period the sway of England in India was virtually suspended. A sense of wrong, and a feeling of intense hatred, rendered a long smouldering spirit of revolt, uncontrollable, and the projected revolution prematurely broke forth, whilst its wide-spreading ramifications were still in progress of maturity and organization.

IV.
The event—
whether a
social insur-
rection or a
military
mutiny?

In this inquiry we should be careful not to confound the results with the causes of the revolt; and to do justice and leave blame alike impartially with those to whom they are due—to attribute the Indian rebellion to mere military mutiny is simply an attempt to throw a veil over causes of long-exercised misrule and misgovernment, which inevitably led to social insurrection. A dispassionate survey of our past Government in India will place causes and effect in clearer light.

It is to be regretted that a question has been raised implicating the long-tried fidelity of the Indian army with a rebellion, having its rise in social and political causes. The revolt was, certainly, so far a military mutiny that soldiers, when they cast off obedience to their officers, or duty to the State, became mutineers or rebels; but mutiny and rebellion are distinct things, and have their rise in distinct causes. Military mutiny may have its rise from slackness of discipline, bad interior economy, and other causes; but when taking part in common cause with the people, it becomes rebellion. This is

Sir Charles
Napier.

not so much a distinction without a difference as many may suppose ; and constitutes one of those “ small points which in time of danger governs “ great events.”

We do a wrong, and an injustice also, in attempting to invest this civil revolt with a character of military mutiny. The attempt involves a tacit depreciation of the services of British officers and native soldiers, whose career in India is inseparably coupled with some of the brightest achievements of our Indian wars—achievements honoured with the approbation of their Sovereign, and the recorded sense of their services and gratitude of their country, frequently signified to them by Parliament.

Are these services to be lost sight of ? eclipsed in the civil rebellion attributable only to the impolicy of the civil Government of India ? Is it to be supposed that the rule and policy of our Indian Government, universally condemned by the country, can efface such services ? or that they are to be committed to futurity in England’s history, associated in record with a social rebellion, miscalled a military mutiny, and which the army did not originate in either sense ?

To account for the sudden transition of feeling of a loyal Sepoy to that of a ferocious demon, we

must call to aid the natural impulses of various natures.

The services of the Sepoys cannot be forgotten, though they became the tools of conspiring mercenaries, and lighted the spark and fanned the flame of rebellion.

The story of the sacrilegious cartridges is a myth, as far as its being the cause of the rebellion. The promoters of the revolt laughed at it, and we are told that at Lucknow the Sepoys declared their readiness to eat, let alone to bite the cartridges if their duty required it. The circumstance, however, occurring at the time, was made an available and easy means of exciting the weak and ignorant and evil-disposed among the Hindoos and Mahomedans, and many were impressed with fear and excited to frenzy, in the belief that it was really our purpose forcibly to compel them to renounce their religion. Their violent and impetuous nature once roused, it broke forth in every form of delirium of cruelty and passion.

We have it on record as the opinion of the several distinguished commanders of the armies in India, that the Sepoy is capable of being moved by some of the highest qualities of human nature; undaunted courage and loyalty, with devoted attachment to their commanders,

whose lives they have often saved at the risk of their own in battle.

I have not the least doubt of it; and we should have some consideration for those who err by the fault of others.

I believe that when social order is restored in India, these men, monsters of cruelty as they have shown themselves when provoked, will be far more worthy of trust and confidence, and will sooner yield themselves to law and discipline, than those exalted instigators of the rebellion who kept aloft, and worked secretly before its outbreak. From the qualities possessed by the Sepoy, it must be a question with many whether, had the discipline of the native troops not been withdrawn from their officers to the Government control at Calcutta, the army would have taken part in the rebellion at all.

The faults of the Sepoys were well known, and no one better knew their peculiarity of character, and how to manage them, than Sir Charles Napier. But even his admiration of them as soldiers was qualified with a very significant reservation.

On an occasion of addressing a military memoir to the Governor-General of India, he thus expresses himself:

“ I have had constant communication with,

“ and have studied Bengal and Bombay Sepoys,
 “ for nearly eight years, and could find nothing
 “ to fear from them, *except when ill-used.*”

Sir Charles Napier himself recounts the occurrence of a mutiny of twenty regiments in the army under his command.

Sir Charles Napier is known to have been attached to, and ardently to have admired the Sepoy for his qualities as a soldier.

What is there incompatible in this? Can we ever forget the heroic conduct of the Sikhs and Goorkas in the siege and storm of Delhi? or in the defence of Lucknow? fighting on both occasions in our cause against native troops.

I have seen a letter from an officer commanding one of Her Majesty's regiments during the siege at Lucknow, stating that the Indian troops in every sortie and conflict with the enemy “ fought like devils,” and that he had the greatest difficulty in preventing his men from scattering and giving chase individually, after their example.

To one more instance of the merit and worth of the Sepoy, Gentlemen, I beg to call your attention. It may be usefully borne in recollection, and in justice to them should not be forgotten, demons as they have shown themselves under exasperation from offence or wrong.

During the early part of the rebellion, when, it may be remembered, the public feeling in India was in its most excited state, the body-guard of the Governor-General addressed a memorial to the Governor to be disarmed!

The impulse that animated these men was honourable to them in the highest degree. They feared themselves—they had bound themselves by an oath to take the Governor's life; and, abhorring the treason, they begged to be delivered from the means of perpetrating the crime. It was a noble triumph in a struggle of base and exalted feeling.

The good qualities of the Indian soldier have now, for a lengthened time at least, to pass from our remembrance. We can only think of them with detestation and horror. Under a sense of aggressive wrong to their princes, and oppression to themselves, their better feelings of loyalty and military subordination have turned to foul treason and bitter hatred. Their fears and suspicions once roused, they threw themselves into the rebellion with vindictive rage, and the savage instinct of bloodhounds. We were doomed by them to a frightful fate. A premature outbreak of the rebellion—by ten days only—averted it. In another ten days, not an English man, woman, or child, would

have been left alive to relate the close of our rule in India !

There is no terror on earth more wild and appalling than the unbridled passion of man :—

Schiller.

“ Gefährlich ist's den Leu zu wecken,
 “ Verderblich ist des Tigers zahn ;
 “ Jedoch der schrecklichste der schrecken,
 “ Das ist der Mensch in seinem Wahn.”

v.
State of
public feeling
at the period
of the Rebel-
lion.

The most apparently valid of the deprecatory defences advanced in favour of our commercial rule in India, is, that it was better than that of the native princes, which, if true, in no way extenuates the faults of our Government. Whatever the oppression of their own princes may have been, they have never driven their subjects into revolt; while they have looked on us as rulers for our own ends and interests, their feelings ever embittered by a conscious sense of living under the humiliation of foreign dominion.

The instances of kind feeling which may have appeared at the outset and during the progress of the rebellion among the native population, bruited with much parade by those who seek to veil the real cause, and make light of the revolt, are but the rare exceptions, not the rule, by which we can estimate the sincerity of the public feeling. Many of us have heard instances of the native population, while professing kindness, secretly betraying the victims they pretended to serve and protect.

It has also been loudly vaunted by those who desire to give the rebellion an exclusively military character, that the civil population stood

aloof, and took no part in the revolt. Many instances, on the contrary, are known to have occurred, not merely of declining aid and protection, but of their betraying and driving English men, women, and children to certain death. The extracts from official papers which I am about to transcribe, will show, that the native soldiery, during a long course of years previous to the moment of their being induced to take part in the rebellion, were the only part of the native population that did not detest the name of an Englishman.

Every advance made in fathoming the causes of the rebellion, from the first natural impulse of hatred to foreign dominion to the climax of implacable hatred and consummation of revolt, show those causes to have resulted, and, naturally so, from the administration of a commercial government.

Adam Smith. Our great political economist accounts, in a general way, for this feeling.

‘Wealth of Nations.’

Referring to India, he observes,—“Many who
 “had been bred in the superior classes, and not
 “being able to find employment in their own
 “business, would be glad to seek it in the
 “lowest. The lowest class, not only being
 “overstocked with its own workmen, but with
 “the overflowings of all the other classes, the
 “competition for employment would be so great

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“ in it, as to reduce the wages of labour to the
 “ most miserable and scanty subsistence of the
 “ labourer. Many would not be able to find
 “ employment even upon these hard terms, but
 “ would either starve, or be driven to seek a
 “ subsistence either by begging, or by the per-
 “ petration perhaps of the greatest enormities.
 “ Want, famine, and mortality, would imme-
 “ diately prevail in that class, and from thence
 “ extend themselves to all the superior classes,
 “ till the number of inhabitants in the country
 “ was reduced to what would easily be main-
 “ tained by the revenue and stock which re-
 “ mained in it, and which had escaped either the
 “ tyranny or calamity which had destroyed the
 “ rest. This perhaps is nearly the present state
 “ of Bengal, and of some other of the English
 “ settlements in the East Indies.”

In this we have an insight into the feelings of the people of India upwards of half a century ago. Here follows an unquestionable evidence of what that feeling was not long previous to the outbreak of the rebellion :

The Governor-General, in a letter addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, on the disposition of the people of the country round Umballah, thus expresses himself :—

Mooltan,
 30 December,
 1849.

“ The country about Umballah is more Sikh
 “ than any part of the Punjaub; the Manjha,

“ and the great chiefs Puttecald, Jhund, &c.,
 “ are independent though friendly ; the latter
 “ quality evinced in the manner men are most
 “ unwilling to show it, viz., parting with their
 “ money. They volunteered to lend me, and
 “ did lend me thirty lacs on the spot last
 “ war. *But the people of course hate us like*
 “ *Sikhs.*”

“ This place is a melancholy mass of deso-
 “ lation.”

Sad, and strange reflection ! What must be
 the nature of that Government, by which, after
 a lapse of a century's duration, we should, as a
 matter of course, be hated by the Indian people ?

These extracts will thus far show the proxi-
 mate causes of the rebellion, and the state of
 public feeling at the period of its outbreak.
 Those which I am about to subjoin to them will
 afford a view of the antecedent state of India,
 exciting wonder, that a Government constituted
 so devoid of system and responsibility, with
 laws inapplicable to the habits, temperament,
 and understanding of the people, regardless of
 experience from the past, and without defined
 prospective views for the future, unstatesmanlike
 in its pretensions, administration, and even
 unimposing in its name in the eyes of the sove-
 reign princes it controlled, could have retained
 any influence so long. At length, left without

military security, and bearing within itself the causes of discontent and seeds of decline, it morally succumbed under a rebellion of the people.

VI.
Insecurity of
our position in
India from
civil revolt.

It is unnecessary, Gentlemen, that I should offer any prelude to the following extracts from Lord Metcalfe's official papers, beyond expressing my humble sense of the public service rendered by J. W. Kaye, Esquire, in giving publicity to his admirable and judicious selection from Lord Metcalfe's Papers on the Government of India.

Lord Metcalfe, 1814.

" Our empire in India has arisen from the superiority of our military prowess. Its stability rests entirely on the same foundation. Let this foundation be removed, and the fabric must fall to the ground. Whatever delusions may prevail in England respecting the security to be derived from the affections of our Indian subjects, and a character for the moderation and forbearance with foreign native states, it will probably be admitted in India, that our power depends solely on our military superiority."

Lord Metcalfe, 1814.

" The plans constantly in the contemplation of the Government at home for the reduction of our military expenses in India, seem to be founded on the erroneous supposition that the Indian empire is in a state of perfect security, that we have no danger to apprehend from

“ external enemies, or internal disaffection, and
 “ that we may reduce our military force without
 “ fear of the consequent overthrow of our
 “ power.

“ To those who take the preceding view of
 “ the state of India, it will be something new
 “ and unpleasant to learn, not only that our
 “ military force cannot be reduced without the
 “ danger, nay, the certainty, of the loss of our
 “ dominion ; but, moreover, that we must con-
 “ siderably increase our military establishments,
 “ or expect the consequences which those rulers
 “ suffer who neglect to provide for the safety of
 “ the empires entrusted to them.

“ Until the Government at home be convinced
 “ that our situation in India is beset with
 “ dangers, and that we have still to make fur-
 “ ther great exertions to secure our safety,
 “ there can be little hope that we shall long
 “ retain the dominions that we have acquired.

“ Our situation in India has always been
 “ precarious. It is still precarious, not less so,
 “ perhaps, at the present moment, by the fault
 “ of the system prescribed by the Government
 “ at home, than at any former period. We are
 “ still a handful of Europeans, governing an
 “ immense empire without any firm hold in the
 “ country, having warlike and powerful enemies
 “ on all our frontiers, and the spirit of disaffec-

“ tion dormant, but rooted universally among
“ our subjects.

“ That insuperable separation which exists
“ between us and our subjects, renders it neces-
“ sary to keep them in subjection by the pre-
“ sence of a military force, and impossible to
“ repose confidence in their affection or fidelity
“ for assistance in the defence of our territories.”

VII.
Military
insecurity of
the empire.
Lord Met-
calfe, 1814.

“ This is a subject that cannot be taken too
“ much into deep consideration.

“ On our military superiority our power en-
“ tirely depends ; that superiority is lessened by
“ every defeat.

“ It is true that our superiority in the field
“ has not yet been called in question by any
“ untoward event, and as long as we retain our
“ superiority in the field, our power may be
“ considered secure ; but repeated failures of any
“ kind must accustom our troops to defeat ; must
“ diminish their confidence in themselves ; must
“ increase their respect for their enemies ; and
“ must lay the foundation for great reverses of
“ fortune.

“ Often has the fate of India depended on a
“ single army ; and, if ever, by any combination
“ of unfortunate accidents, such scenes should be
“ in an army in the field, having the fate of our
“ empire in great measure attached to it, as have
“ occurred more than once in storming parties ;
“ and even in considerable detachments, our
“ power might receive a blow, from which its
“ recovery would be questionable.

“ We are apt to despise our opponents, till
“ from defeat we acquire an opposite sensation.

“ Before we come to the contest, their powers
 “ of resistance are ridiculed. Their forts are
 “ said to be contemptible, and their arms are
 “ described to be useless; yet we find, on the
 “ trial, that with their useless weapons, and
 “ contemptible tools, they can deal about death
 “ amongst their assailants, and stand to their
 “ defences, notwithstanding the skill and bravery
 “ of our army. If we were not misled before-
 “ hand by a flattering persuasion of the facility
 “ of conquest, we should take greater pains to
 “ insure it.

“ It is desirable that a large battering train,
 “ with every equipment for a siege on a large
 “ scale, should accompany every army that may
 “ have to attack forts.

“ This may appear to be an unnecessary cau-
 “ tion, as it will probably be supposed that the
 “ measure suggested must be obviously adopted
 “ on all occasions; but, in fact, it frequently
 “ happens that the equipments in this respect are
 “ very deficient; and by no means adequate to
 “ the object in view.

“ We have on our side the science of Europe,
 “ and we ought to bring it into play. Economy
 “ in this department is ruinous. We ought to
 “ be lavish of the contents of our arsenals, and
 “ saving of the lives of our men. We ought to
 “ make defence impracticable and hopeless. We

“ ought to overpower resistance, by the vastness
 “ of our means. Though such measures were not
 “ necessary formerly, they have become so by a
 “ change of circumstances. Our former won-
 “ derful success arose from causes which have
 “ ceased to exist, or do not prevail in the same
 “ degree. We ought to substitute — and we
 “ have it in our power to substitute — other
 “ means of victory sufficiently potent, though of
 “ a different nature.

Lord Met-
calfe, 1835.

“ Our danger does not lie alone in the mili-
 “ tary force of native states, but in the spirit by
 “ which they are actuated towards us ; and still
 “ more in the spirit of our subjects, from one
 “ end of India to the other. We have no hold
 “ on their affections ; more than that, disaffec-
 “ tion is universal. So that what to a power
 “ supported by the affections of its subjects
 “ would be a slight disaster, might to us be an
 “ irreparable calamity.

“ Some say that our empire in India rests on
 “ opinion, others on main force. It, in fact,
 “ depends on both. We could not keep the
 “ country by opinion, if we had not a consi-
 “ derable force ; and no force that we could pay
 “ would be sufficient if it were not aided by the
 “ opinion of our invincibility ; our force does
 “ not operate so much by its actual strength, as
 “ by the impression which it produces, and that

“ impression is the opinion by which we hold
“ India.

“ Internal insurrection, therefore, is one of
“ the greatest of our dangers, or, rather, be-
“ comes so, when the means of quelling it are at
“ a distance. It is easy to decide it, because
“ insurgents may not have the horse, foot, and
“ artillery of a regular army ; but it becomes
“ serious, if we have not those materials at hand.
“ Nothing can be a stronger proof of our weak-
“ ness in the absence of a military force, even
“ when it is not far removed, than the history of
“ such insurrections as have occurred. The civil
“ power, and all semblance of the existence of our
“ Government, are instantly swept away by the
“ torrent. We need not go far back to show, that
“ in the neighbourhood of the metropolis of
“ British India, within a forced march of one of
“ our largest military stations, our Government
“ was subverted throughout a considerable extent
“ of territory ; our magistrates, with all the
“ power that they could collect, driven like
“ chaff before the wind, and an insurrectionary
“ authority established by a handful of men,
“ proclaiming the overthrow of our dominion,
“ and the establishment of a new dynasty in the
“ person of the leader of a band of fanatics.
“ This state of things continued for several days,
“ until the insurrection was suppressed by the

“ application of military force, without which
 “ it is impossible to say to what extent it
 “ might have proceeded, so completely were
 “ the insurgents masters of the neighbouring
 “ country.

“ It may be said that no native power can
 “ contend with us single handed ; if we could
 “ bring all our resources against them, they most
 “ probably could not. But we have no right to
 “ expect that any war would be single handed.
 “ We must be prepared for an offensive war,
 “ with all difficulties against us. A merely
 “ defensive war would be to us nearly the same
 “ as a defeat. It would be a change, and evi-
 “ dence of weakness, which our power could
 “ hardly survive. It is not, therefore, enough
 “ to say, that no one power, single handed, is a
 “ match for us. We should not be here, if any
 “ were. The question is, can we conquer them
 “ all at once ? for the power to do that is neces-
 “ sary for our safety.”

VIII.
Amalgama-
tion of the
Indian and
English army.

On this important question, Lord Metcalfe, as Governor-General of India, regarded the measure as one of necessary adoption and of public benefit.

His Lordship writes thus :—

1836.

“ In its future disposal, the army ought to be
“ transferred to the Crown. Its existence as a
“ separate body, calling the Company master,
“ and yet having no respect for the Company,
“ or for its authorities, is incompatible with that
“ spirit of subordination and discipline, and
“ loyal devotion, without which an army may
“ become dangerous. The Company’s army has
“ always done its duty in the field nobly : and
“ no army in the world, perhaps, has a higher
“ tone in that respect. But it exists in a state
“ of continual discontent, from the comparison
“ which is ever before its eyes of the scantiness
“ of military allowances with the large salaries
“ of the civil service, and is driven almost to
“ phrenzy by any attempt to reduce those
“ allowances, already considered too small.

“ The Indian army, although it be taken
“ under the Crown, must, nevertheless, continue
“ a separate body ; that is, it must be officered
“ as at present, by officers brought up in its

“ own bosom. Officers of the European portion
 “ of the army ought not to be transferred to the
 “ direct command of native troops ; but officers
 “ from the Indian army might be allowed to
 “ purchase, or to be removed into the European
 “ army ; and the prospect of this at some period
 “ would form a bond of connection between the
 “ two services, which would be strengthened by
 “ putting the officers of both services on the
 “ same footing from the time of their ceasing to
 “ be regimental officers—that is, from their pro-
 “ motion to general officers, giving to the Indian
 “ officer the privilege in common with the
 “ European officer, of being able to serve his
 “ country in the fields of Europe.”

IX.
Policy of
Government:
Duty towards
Native States.
Lord Met-
calfe, 1835.

“ The difference between the interfering and
“ non-interfering policy is not that of interfering
“ on all occasions and not interfering on any,
“ because, as the predominant power in India,
“ interference is sometimes forced upon us, how-
“ ever reluctant we may be to adopt it.

“ The difference is, that the upholders of non-
“ interference avoid interference as much as
“ possible, while the opposite party are rather
“ disposed to avail themselves of every oppor-
“ tunity to exercise it; see occasions for it which
“ the others do not; and assert the right of
“ assuming it when the others would maintain
“ that such a right does not exist, or is very
“ questionable; and in every case in which the
“ question is, whether interference shall be ex-
“ ercised or not, or to what degree it shall be
“ exercised, every one will naturally be biassed
“ by his preconceived opinion on the general
“ question. Both parties, of course, aim at the
“ public welfare, and each advocates that line of
“ policy which it deems to be best.

“ The Interference Policy appears to me to
“ be arbitrary. We interfere in the affairs of
“ foreign states as we like. We put up and put
“ down princes and ministers at our pleasure;

“ set princes over subjects, and ministers over
 “ princes, as we think proper. We do not allow
 “ the general feeling of the people to operate,
 “ but act according to our own notions of what
 “ is right and expedient. The bad tendency of
 “ this policy is manifold. It destroys entirely
 “ the independence of the foreign state, and
 “ paralyzes its energies. It also throws the
 “ weight of our power into the scale of the
 “ Government, and destroys the ability of the
 “ people to redress their grievances. It places
 “ us on the anti-popular side, and causes us to
 “ be detested. It relieves the native Govern-
 “ ment from the necessity of conciliating its
 “ subjects, and, of course, promotes oppression.
 “ While we give this injurious support to the
 “ Government, we scarcely ever interfere suffi-
 “ ciently to prevent oppression and misrule, and
 “ can hardly do so without taking the govern-
 “ ment into our own hands, and thus putting an
 “ end, even to the semblance of independence.

“ Another evil of interference is, that it gives
 “ too much power to our agents at foreign courts,
 “ and makes princes and ministers very much
 “ the slaves or subjects of their will. An inter-
 “ fering agent is an abominable nuisance wher-
 “ ever he may be, and our agents are apt to take
 “ that turn. They like to be masters instead of
 “ mere negociators. They imagine, often very

“ erroneously, that they can do good by meddling in other people’s affairs ; and they are impatient in witnessing any disorder which they think may be remedied by our interference, forgetting that one step in this course will, unavoidably, be followed by others, which will most probably lead to the destruction of the independence of the state concerned.

“ It must be admitted to be an evil of the non-interfering policy, that temporary and local disorder may ensue, and must be tolerated, if we mean to adhere strictly to that principle. But this is a consequence which we naturally dislike. We are not disposed to wait until things settle themselves in their natural course. We think ourselves called on to interfere, and some bungling or unnatural arrangement is made by our will, which, because it is our own, we ever after support, against the inclination of the people, and their notions of right and justice.

“ The true basis of non-interference, is a respect for the rights of others—for the rights of all—people as well as princes. The treaties by which we are connected with native states are, with rare exceptions, founded on their independence in internal affairs. It is customary with the advocates of interference, to twist our obligation of protection against

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“ enemies into a right to interfere in the internal affairs of protected states—a right, however, which our treaties generally do not give us, otherwise than as the supporters of the legitimate sovereign, against usurpation, or dethronement, in the event of his not having merited the disaffection of his subjects.

“ There are, undoubtedly, extreme cases in which the interference of the protecting power may be unavoidable. Instances of prolonged anarchy, affecting others under our protection, are of this description. It may be said to be a defect of the non-interference policy, that it cannot, in every possible case, be maintained. The same objection would probably be applicable to any system of policy. It need not prevent the maintenance of non-interference as the system, admitting rare interference as the exception. There must, however, be a non-interfering spirit in the Government and its agents, otherwise the exception will prevail over the rule.

“ There are two classes of states in India with which we have relations—those protected and those not protected—which may otherwise be described as external and internal states, or those altogether beyond our extreme frontier, and those encircled by our dominions,

“ or more or less included within the sphere of
 “ our supremacy.

“ The internal states are, in a greater or less
 “ degree, either specifically, or virtually, under
 “ our protection, and it is to these that the ques-
 “ tion of interference or non-interference prin-
 “ cipally refers.

“ The states of Scind, Caubul, Lahore, China,
 “ Nepal, and Ava, are external estates, free as
 “ yet from any pretensions of interference on
 “ our part in their internal affairs. But the
 “ spirit of interference would, no doubt, soon
 “ find cause for the exercise of its withering and
 “ mischievous influences even in these states.

“ If I recollect rightly, it has been recom-
 “ mended to me by our agents, east, north, and
 “ west. The sea being our exterior barrier to
 “ the south, is almost the only power that has
 “ escaped the suggestion. We have laid the
 “ foundation west and south-west, by our trea-
 “ ties, respecting the navigation of the Indus,
 “ which we are now about to promote, by stop-
 “ ping it altogether. The question of inter-
 “ ference, however, relates chiefly, or almost
 “ exclusively, to the internal states — those
 “ which, by treaty or virtually, are under our
 “ protection. With respect to them, we have
 “ no right to interfere in their internal affairs
 “ as long as they can govern themselves, and

“ are inoffensive to others. But prolonged
 “ anarchy can hardly exist without affecting
 “ neighbouring states. The continuance of ex-
 “ treme misrule and oppression, if in the least
 “ degree supported, as it sometimes is, by awe of
 “ our power on the part of the people, ought not
 “ to be tolerated. Unjust usurpation, not caused
 “ by oppression, forces us to take a part, for we
 “ must either acknowledge, and so far counte-
 “ nance the oppression, or we must refuse to ac-
 “ knowledge it, and so far oppose it; and we
 “ could hardly follow the latter course, without
 “ proceeding further, or dissolving our con-
 “ nection with the state so situated. There are
 “ cases in which interference may either be
 “ necessary or justifiable; and it must be re-
 “ membered, that in any case in which external
 “ interference is required, it can only arise from
 “ us. Other native states are precluded from
 “ it, if of the protected class, by their relations
 “ with us; if beyond the circle of our supre-
 “ macy, by our intolerance of their interference
 “ within it. These remedies, therefore, for in-
 “ ternal distraction, which are available in com-
 “ munities of states left under the supremacy of
 “ one protecting overawing power, cannot here
 “ be had recourse to. The British Government
 “ is the sole referee where reference is necessary.
 “ Absolute non-interference on every occasion

“ is therefore absolutely impossible. There is,
 “ nevertheless, a wide difference between a re-
 “ luctant interference, when it is unavoidable,
 “ and a disposition to rush into interference
 “ when it is not necessary; and in this consists
 “ the difference between the two systems of
 “ policy.

“ The advocates of interference would pro-
 “ bably maintain that it is right to anticipate
 “ mischief, and prevent it by decided inter-
 “ ference; and as disorder will sometimes follow
 “ our adherence to non-interference, there would
 “ be much weight in that argument if our inter-
 “ ference were always productive of good. But
 “ we often create and aggravate mischief and
 “ disorder by injudicious interference, and pre-
 “ vent a natural settlement of affairs which would
 “ otherwise take place. One of the strongest
 “ arguments in my mind against interference is
 “ that it is more apt to work evil than good.
 “ There is nothing in our political administra-
 “ tion that requires so much circumspection, and
 “ caution, and discreet judgment as interference
 “ in the affairs of other states. A single mis-
 “ take on the part of an agent may cause irre-
 “ parable mischief; and the power left to agents
 “ on such occasions is immense. Almost every-
 “ thing depends on their judgment. The effects
 “ of interference are anything but certain. It

“ is not, therefore, a conclusive argument in
 “ favour of interference, although it is the best,
 “ that we may thereby prevent evil ; for, on
 “ the contrary, we are just as likely to create it,
 “ I should indeed say infinitely more so. And
 “ the evil created by interference is generally
 “ irremediable. It virtually, if not ostensibly
 “ destroys the state to which it is applied, and
 “ leaves it only a nominal, if any existence ;
 “ while on ourselves it confirms all the preva-
 “ lent opinions of our systematic encroachment,
 “ drawing on us all the odium of aggression ; a
 “ state of things which, instead of seeking, we
 “ ought, in justice to ourselves, most studiously
 “ to avoid.”

X.
Colonization.
1814.

On the question of colonization, Lord Metcalfe writes thus :—

“ It is impracticable, perhaps, to suggest a remedy for the general disaffection of our Indian subjects.

“ Colonization seems to be the only system which could give us a chance of having any part of the population attached to our Government from a sense of common interests.

“ Colonization may have its attendant evils, but with reference to the consideration above stated, it would promise to give us a hold in the country, which we do not at present possess. We might now be swept away in a single whirlwind. We are without root. The best affected natives would think of a change of Government with indifference, and in the north-western provinces there is hardly a man who would not hope for benefit from a change.

“ This disaffection, however, will most probably not break out as long as we possess a predominant power; and it has only been alluded to as one source of weakness, and a necessary object of attention in the consideration of our situation.”

XI.
Revenue.

What are England's expectations and views in desiring our Indian empire to be brought under the immediate government of the Crown ?

It is to be hoped the attainment of the long-desired national benefits of its hard-earned, dear-bought conquest—a development of its vast sources and means of wealth, which, being released from the limited pursuits and interests of a chartered commercial Company, will, under sovereign power, flow into channels that will enrich the State.

The causes of failure in the public revenue of India are consequent, on the showing of Adam Smith, to the nature of a commercial government :—

Adam Smith.
'Wealth of
Nations.'
1776.

“ No two characters seem more inconsistent
“ than those of trader and sovereign. If the
“ trading of the East India Company renders
“ them very bad sovereigns, the spirit of
“ sovereignty seems to have rendered them
“ equally bad traders. While they were traders
“ only they managed their trade successfully,
“ and were able to pay from their profits a
“ moderate dividend to the proprietors of their
“ stock. Since they became sovereigns, with
“ a revenue, which, it is said, was originally

“ more than three millions sterling, they have
 “ been obliged to beg the extraordinary assistance
 “ of Government, in order to avoid immediate
 “ bankruptcy. In their former situation, their
 “ servants in India considered themselves as
 “ the clerks of merchants: in their present
 “ situation, these servants consider themselves
 “ as the masters of sovereigns.

“ A company of merchants are, it seems, inca-
 “ pable of considering themselves as sovereigns,
 “ even after they have become such. Trade,
 “ or buying in order to sell again, they still
 “ consider as their principal business; and, by
 “ a strange absurdity, regard the character of
 “ the sovereign as an appendix to that of the
 “ merchant, as something which ought to be
 “ made subservient to it, or by means of which
 “ they may be enabled to buy cheaper in India,
 “ and thereby to sell with a better profit in
 “ Europe. They endeavour, for this purpose,
 “ to keep out as much as possible all competitors
 “ from the market of the countries which are
 “ subject to their government, and, consequently,
 “ to reduce at least some part of the surplus
 “ produce of those countries for what is barely
 “ sufficient for supplying their own demand, or
 “ to what they can expect to sell in Europe
 “ with such a profit as they may think reason-
 “ able. Their mercantile habits draw them in

“ this manner, almost necessarily, though perhaps insensibly, to prefer, upon all ordinary occasions, the little and transitory profit of the monopolist to the great and permanent revenue of the sovereign, and would gradually lead them to treat the countries subject to their government as the Dutch treat the Moluccas. It is the interest of the East India Company, considered as sovereigns, that the European goods which are carried to the Indian dominions should be sold there as cheap as possible; and that the Indian goods brought from thence should bring there as good a price, or should be sold there as dear as possible. But the reverse of this is their interest as merchants. As sovereigns, their interest is exactly the same with that of the country they govern: as merchants, their interest is directly opposite to that interest.”

These principles of constructive government are exemplified in the results of our commercial administration in India.

Lord Metcalfe, 1827-36.

“ No purse but that of the nation will be able to support this expensive concern, for that of the Company cannot after the loss of the China monopoly, and, in fact, has only hitherto done so by borrowing.

“ Borrowing cannot go on for ever; and an attempt to make India pay its own expenses,

“ under all circumstances, might cause the loss
“ of the country.

“ Our hold is so precarious that a very little
“ mismanagement might accomplish our expul-
“ sion, and the course of events may be itself
“ sufficient without any mismanagement.

“ We are, to appearance, now more powerful
“ in India than we ever were; nevertheless, our
“ downfall may be short work. When it com-
“ mences it will probably be rapid, and the
“ world will wonder more at the suddenness
“ with which our immense Indian empire may
“ vanish than it has done at the surprising con-
“ quest we have achieved.

“ The cause of this precariousness is, that our
“ power does not rest on actual strength, but on
“ impression. Our whole real strength consists
“ in the few European regiments, speaking com-
“ paratively, that are scattered singly over the
“ vast space of subjugated India. That is the
“ only portion of our soldiery whose hearts are
“ with us, and whose constancy can be relied on
“ in the hour of trial. All our native establish-
“ ments, military or civil, are the followers of
“ fortune; they serve us for their livelihood,
“ and generally serve us well. From a sense of
“ what is due to the hand that feeds them,
“ which is one of the virtues they most extol,
“ they may often display fidelity under trying

“ circumstances ; but in their inward feelings
 “ they partake more or less of the universal dis-
 “ affection which prevails against us, not from bad
 “ government, but from natural and irresistible
 “ antipathy ; and were, the wind to change—to
 “ use a native expression—and to set in steadily
 “ against us, we could not expect that their
 “ sense of honour—although there might be
 “ splendid instances of devotion—would keep the
 “ mass on our side in opposition to the common
 “ feeling which, with one view, might for a
 “ time unite all India from one end to the other.

“ Empires grow old, decay, and perish. Ours
 “ in India can hardly be called old, but seems
 “ destined to be short lived. We appear to
 “ have passed the brilliancy and vigour of our
 “ youth, and it may be that we have reached a
 “ premature old age. We have ceased to be
 “ the wonder we were to the natives ; the charm
 “ which encompassed us has been dissolved ; and
 “ our subjects have had time to inquire why
 “ they have been subdued. The consequences
 “ of the inquiry may appear hereafter.

“ The revenues of India are not equal to the
 “ support of its expenses, and, judging from
 “ past experience, are not likely to become so.
 “ We may, and we must reduce our ordinary
 “ expenditure within our income ; but we have a
 “ heavy debt to discharge, and we have no

“ security against future wars, which must in-
 “ crease our financial difficulties. There is
 “ little hope of a permanent reduction of esta-
 “ blishments: there is a continual tendency to
 “ increase. Some branches of revenue are likely
 “ to fall off; there is no satisfactory assurance
 “ of great increase in any others. The sea
 “ customs, now exceedingly low, are susceptible
 “ of improvement, but it can only be by levying
 “ higher duties on the trade with Europe, to
 “ which the merchants of England would object.
 “ There is, indeed, remote prospect of increase
 “ of revenue from the increased influx of
 “ Europeans, but this is at present speculative;
 “ and whether an increase of revenue or an
 “ increase of expense, from more expansive esta-
 “ blishments, will be the result of an extension
 “ of the European population is uncertain.

“ It is, therefore, to be apprehended, that the
 “ Government will scarcely have the power of
 “ reducing taxation, as it will hardly have the
 “ means, with its present revenue, of supporting
 “ its expenses. The former may be the less
 “ regretted, as the effect of reducing taxation
 “ in any shape in which it would have to be
 “ accomplished, is far from certain. The only
 “ branch of our taxation that can be called
 “ excessive, is the land revenue, the chief
 “ resource that maintains the State. A reduc-

" tion of this, justly apportioned, would con-
 " tribute to the comfort of the mass of our
 " subjects, the village population, but would not
 " make them wealthy. If apportioned without
 " great care and strict regard to justice, it would
 " not even promote their comfort, but would
 " most probably do them injury. That reduc-
 " tion, however, whatever might be its con-
 " sequences, we are not in a condition to afford.
 " Our Government is not a national Govern-
 " ment, that can rely on the affections of its
 " subjects for defence against foreign invasion.
 " It is the curse of a Government over a con-
 " quered country that it cannot trust the people.
 " Our subjects are internal enemies, ready at
 " least for change, if not ripe for insurrection;
 " the best affected, are passive votaries of fate.
 " We can retain our dominion only by a large
 " military establishment; and without a con-
 " siderable force of British troops, the fidelity
 " of our native army could not be relied on.
 " It would be difficult to calculate precisely
 " what is requisite; it is easy to see, for security,
 " we have not too much. It seems that we ought
 " to maintain all that we can pay, and to pay
 " them we require all the revenue we can raise.
 " A reduction of taxation for any beneficial
 " consequence appears to be hopeless.

" The most obvious benefit on which to cal-

“ culate, but that hitherto much disputed, is
 “ the admission of Europeans to settle and hold
 “ property in India. Their settlement has
 “ never been entirely prohibited, and latterly
 “ has been facilitated and encouraged ; but the
 “ removal of remaining restrictions on their
 “ lawfully acquiring and holding property is
 “ necessary ; and for their satisfaction, the
 “ cessation of the power possessed by the
 “ Government of sending them out of the
 “ country is indispensable. The existence of
 “ this power is dwelt upon by them as the greatest
 “ hardship to which they are subject. They
 “ profess to regard it as destroying the value of
 “ all property, even if they were allowed to hold
 “ it, and rendering it so precarious, as to pre-
 “ clude the probability that any one possessing
 “ capital would voluntarily expose himself to
 “ the danger of losing it by becoming subject to
 “ the exercise of this arbitrary power. These
 “ obstacles removed, and the settlement of
 “ Europeans allowed to take its natural course,
 “ progressive improvement is the result that
 “ may be anticipated. There must be added,
 “ the abolition of those unjust distinctions which
 “ exclude the profits of India from the markets
 “ of Great Britain and Ireland, the consequences
 “ of which abolition are at present incalculable,
 “ and may be immense. It is impossible to see

“ to what extent the resources of this productive
 “ country may be drawn forth by European
 “ enterprise, skill, and capital.”

“ It seems wonderful that the policy acted on
 “ in a conquered country, should have been to
 “ exclude our own countrymen from acquiring
 “ influence among the people. It may be too
 “ late to prevent the injurious effects of such a
 “ policy, as the operation of a more natural
 “ course must be slow, and the greater part of a
 “ century has been thrown away.”

XII.
Free press in
India.

There are two causes still unnoticed, Gentlemen, which, from their powerful moral agency, have greatly facilitated the progress and consummation of the revolt in India—and to which I will now solicit your attention, in proof that that disaster had its rise in social rebellion and not in military mutiny. These causes are, freedom of the press and religious proselytism.

A free press is a mighty engine of moral influence, to work good or to work evil. Its benefits are invaluable when employed to define and uphold the real constitutional power of a state—the integrity of its laws—the sacredness of religion. When employed to these great ends, the freedom of the press is a nation's blessing.

It has its annoyances—vituperative slander and anonymous abuse; but where freedom of the press prevails, these, restrained by the laws, are of little moment.

But when it labours to detract from high character, exalted power, and public virtue, to undermine constitutional power, to mystify or dispute the inviolability of the laws, advocate political faction as the purity of patriotism—then, the freedom of the press becomes a nation's curse.

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License, not freedom of the press, had long prevailed in India previous to the rebellion; either ignored, or feared, but unrepressed, circulating contempt and hatred of our Government to the remotest parts of our dominion.

The evil had spread long previous to the rule of the present Governor-General; but His Excellency promptly and wisely put a check to it. To have permitted a continued unrestricted circulation of treason, and incitement to revolt, would have been a gratuitous surrender of our empire in India under similar horrors to those which marked the first outbreak of the rebellion.

Among Lord Metcalfe's papers, there are many minutes on the press of India, written in that spirit of sound wisdom and enlightened views which marked the principles of his public life. The following note is one of those applicable to the existing restriction on the press:—

Lord Metcalfe, 1828.

“I take it as universally granted, that the
“press ought to be free, and subject of course to
“the laws, provided that it be not dangerous to
“the stability of our Indian empire.

“Should it ever threaten to become so, the
“local Government ought undoubtedly to possess
“the local power of protecting the safety of the
“State against this or any other danger, from
“whatever quarter it may proceed; because
“it is impossible in this distant region, that we

“ can be protected on emergency by any enactments of the mother country.”

On the outbreak of the Indian revolt, part of the foreign press had taken a view of the event, that was highly honourable to their feelings as allies, and to their principles as public writers.

On the fall of Delhi, a change came o’er the scene, and the sympathy which was afforded us under the pressure of a perilous national crisis, was in some instances suddenly changed to bitter vituperative depreciation of our professional skill and qualities during the siege, and alleged brutal abuse of our victory.

We can afford to such writers whatever degree of censure they may please to attach to that unsurpassed achievement of military science and valour. With feelings alive to the motives of all generous and honourable minds, we can receive and estimate at its true worth, sympathy in reverse, and just congratulation in triumph. To mere detractors of our army’s fame, it is sufficient to apply the words of a fascinating French moralist :—

Lafontaine.

“ Ceci s’adresse à vous, esprits du dernier ordre,
 “ Qui n’étant bons à rien, cherchez sur tout à mordre.
 “ Vous vous tourmentez vainement.
 “ Croyez-vous que vos dents impriment leurs outrages
 “ Sur tant de beaux ouvrages ?
 “ Ils sont pour vous d’airain, d’acier, de diamant.”

XIII.
Religious Pro-
selytism in
in India.

The missionary movement now preparing to undertake the spread of Christianity in India has not, that I have heard, received encouragement either from Her Majesty's Government or the Legislature. It will not, therefore, I hope, be considered presumption if I notice two points of national interest before questioning the probable issue of the undertaking in contemplation.

The first of these points, which certainly is in every view calculated to excite surprise, is the fact, that we are embarking in a crusade of religious proselytism in India, while thousands of our own countrymen in England know not what Christianity is; thousands that are without the means of religious worship or religious teaching. Nay, there are many schools in England in which all teaching of religion is prohibited.

While labouring to redeem the country from the anarchy of the first revolution, the first Napoleon, in his celebrated Code, and by every other means, endeavoured to establish national religion. He did wisely, legislatively and morally so; for in nations without religious teaching religion becomes but an affair of chance, impulse, or individuality; its influence in social order profitless, indefinable.

The second point, as it would affect India, is of no less national importance. To attempt religious proselytism at a moment when India is in a ferment of insurrectional excitement from one end to the other would be nothing short of madness. It would lead naturally to the greatest of all social evils—a religious war—in which we should in a very short period be driven from the country.

To proceed to the consideration of the undertaking :—

If our sway in India was based on the tenets, or what alone is availing in Christianity, its practice, we might openly assume the sacred mission of religious leaders; but that has not been the case. On the contrary, we have in some instances feared, or, from expediency, have shrunk from open manifestation of our faith, and have proportionately suffered in the loss of the respect and influential control over the people. We should be openly, virtually, and essentially what it is to be hoped we really are. Nothing could more damage the cause of Christianity than its apparent or supposed abnegation from causes of moral cowardice, or worse, from the poor pretensions of expediency.

To attempt proselytism in India we should at least be prepared by possessing the friendly feelings of the people. We should be looked up to

from social respect and a general confidence on their part in our disinterestedness and fair dealing in the transactions of life, and especially so, as their rulers, in our unvarying good faith and honourable interpretation of all questions at issue touching their property or social rights.

We should leave to the native states full liberty to follow their own religion, whether it be a religion of ceremonial rites or of faith.

No one can fail to be impressed with the motives of the gentlemen now about to proceed to India in the sacred cause they have at heart; to share those motives; to do justice to their spirit of enterprise; to entertain devout respect to their matured study of the sacred writings; and the devotion with which assuredly they would become martyrs in the cause they have in hand. But there is a time for all things, and this is not the time to attempt religious conversion in India. Previous to the rebellion the Bible had been desecrated in being offered to infidels and heathens still in the delirium of the promised sensual heaven of Mahomed, or worshippers of the foul rites and unhallowed futurity of Vishnu. We must study human nature as well as religion, before we can reasonably hope to make converts to Christianity from among such darkened minds.

The contemplation of religious proselytism in India, as a duty involving the temporal and eternal welfare of those we rule over, will eventually become a subject of first and highest importance in its claims to the attention of England's Government and Legislature. But the religious enlightenment of countless numbers in an empire like India, lies hidden in the decrees and time of Almighty Power; and while ever ready to advance and promote it, we should be most cautious in the intervention of human wisdom.

It does not follow, as has been too strenuously asserted, that because we do not prohibit the unholy rites and offices of the heathen and Mahomedan religions, that we encourage them. But we have erred greatly, and scandalized the name of Christianity, in contributing to the maintenance of infidel and pagan priests and heathen temples.

The State Church of England, should be the State Church of India, openly professed, and sacredly guarded as such.

We need not become Pharisees, and sound a trumpet when we proclaim a fast, give alms, or sanctify the sabbath. There are other means of letting our light so shine before men, as to give hope of our drawing converts to the gospel, and aspire to a participation in the fulfilment of

the divine behest of making known the Word to the ends of the earth and to all nations.

We can only hope to be thus favoured, and gain converts to Christianity, by those divine influences which will assuredly prosper our work in such a cause. Be the divine teaching of Christianity our guide and end. Let us deserve and gain the affections of the people. When they can look up to you in respect for the equity of your laws, and revere your religion, as they mark its influences in individual example, then alone will you gain converts to Christianity. But the social condition of the people of India is an object calling for attention before legislative amendment or religious teaching. Laws and religion, be it remembered, were made for man, not man for laws and religion.

XIV.
Prospective
Government
of India.

Among the future records of the Indian rebellion will be found a memorial from the East India Company, addressed to the Lords and Commons' Houses of Parliament, embodying a protest against any interference with their charter, and claim to an uninterrupted maintenance of its governing provisions.

The grounds of such a claim are certainly not to be traced in the existing military, political, financial, commercial, or social state of India.

The rebellion in India had its rise in remote causes—set forth in few words in the quotations prefixed to this professional inquiry. It has been the natural result of a Government of many parts, each part possessing its own intrinsic influence, with optional valid show of repudiating responsibility.

Such a Government had long lost all public confidence. Its wars, in some instances unavoidable, but never paid for at the moment, entailed heavy debt on England. Monopoly of trade, exercised under the exclusive provisions of the charter, had the consequence of repressing European immigration, and, consequently, the commercial enterprise of England: while England, passive in a neglect of the develop-

ment of its vast resources, also forfeited all benefit derivable from her mighty conquest.

A policy of annexation, to which the rulers of the native states were not consenting parties, caused the discontent and led to the revolt of some of the most influential and powerful princes. Hence arose defection, secretly spread among the native troops, and the organized revolt which broke forth last year. The combined injudicious parsimony of the East India Company, which declined applying for an augmented British force in India, and the fatal legislative home economy which precluded the maintenance of an army adequate to its security, completed a chain of causes each in itself sufficient to divest dominion of all moral influence, security, or control.

As far back as 1784, Mr. Pitt urged the evident absolute necessity of bringing the government of India under the responsibility of the ministers of the Crown, with whom "the constitution had placed all power in the executive government of the country."

Later, this change was advocated by Lord Metcalfe, when Governor-General in India :—

Lord Metcalfe, 1836.

" The Europeans settled in India, and not in the Company's service, and to these might be added generally the East Indians of mixed breed, will never be satisfied with the Com-

“pany’s government. Well or ill-founded, they will always attach to it the notion of monopoly and exclusion ; they will consider themselves comparatively discountenanced and unfavoured ; and will always look with desire to the substitution of Crown government : for the contentment of this class, which, for the benefit of India and the security of our Indian empire, ought greatly to increase in numbers and importance, the introduction of Crown government is undoubtedly desirable.”

Again, he adds :—

“ It is undoubtedly desirable that there should be an unity of authority, and that every part of India should, in every respect, be under one supreme government.”

And, finally, Her Majesty’s late Government brought into Parliament a Bill for the better government of India, by bringing India under the government of the Crown.

As regards the natives, they instinctively associate regal supremacy with power. They behold with contempt all power without the imposing influences of splendour and absolute dominion, and would bow their foreheads in the dust in religious allegiance to the Sovereign of Britain as empress of the East, while they would spurn the control of a chartered commercial Company.

The rebellion of India has entailed on England calamities incalculable ; yet with incalculable future beneficial results, if we make good uses of adversity.

Perhaps no nation had ever such an opportunity of doing good, and at the same time gaining honour in the eyes of other nations for wisdom and beneficence in administrative dominion, as England at the present moment.

We have now to prepare ourselves as just and unimpassioned arbiters in the sacred duty of judges on past events, no less than the preparation of laws and government for the future political and social welfare of the vast empire in its destinies inseparably united with and influencing those of England. Let us not forget our part in the errors which have passed.

We are, in a manner, on our trial—the eyes of the whole world are fixed on us—scrutinizing every phase of this unprecedented convulsive crisis ; and England's name will receive added lustre, and our national influence derive more weight in the view of other nations, or irretrievably fall in their estimation, according to the position we assume, and the principles on which we base our future government of India.

England, supremely blest in a constitutional government of Church, Crown, and State, with political liberty unknown to other nations, her

people at once religious, loyal, and brave, ought to be as eminent in her power of inculcating and imparting those advantages to those under her supremacy as she is herself distinguished in their possession.

There is an ambition which constitutes virtue. It is that which, in conquest, leads us to consider and promote the welfare of those whom we have brought under our rule.

There is an ambition of opposite character, in which public virtue is absorbed in interested selfishness. One of these guiding influences will, in the eyes of the world and of posterity, be regarded as the policy and principle on which England governs India.

We have hitherto built vainly, Gentlemen. Let us quit our edifice erected on sand, and build on that rock—the Rock of Ages—which never fails. Let us renounce our past system, and govern by higher motives—by paternal legislation—by suitable and *desired* social reform. Vindicate the good faith of England, questioned by those we govern. Legislate for the interests of India, as well as for those of England. Gain the affections of the people by beneficent laws, administrative justice, and strict honour, in individual and in public dealing. The time may be remote when these seeds may take a root; our labour may be long—our forbearance greatly

tried, but our perseverance must be unremitting. We have high stakes at issue, national honour, and the gain or loss of a mighty empire.

These are feebly traced, but valuable lessons of Government left to us by many illustrious men who have held sway and government in India ; and if Metcalfe, Wellesley, Monro, Malcolm, Shore, Elphinstone, and Napier, have not written and predicted in vain, England may establish and transmit to posterity the greatest and most enduring empire of military power and commercial wealth yet known in the annals of the world.

xv.
General
Observations.

The moral of the foregoing inquiry, Gentlemen, can receive its solution solely in the future legislative military policy of the House of Commons of England, and in the principle of government on which we in future rule our Indian empire. The inquiry was suggested to me by the still unsubdued revolt, which, as an occurrence of unexampled national disaster, struck me as an opportunity admitting of more plainly and forcibly illustrating the evils of our legislative military system than the details I had previously ventured to bring under your attention in connection with the Peninsular and Crimean wars.

The rebellion in India has rendered necessary a change in the construction and constitution of our Indian Government; but the adoption of that change has been differently viewed as a matter of time delayed, or of immediate necessity.

Viewed as a question of government to be established on military power, there can be no doubt but that on military principle the adopted change should be immediate. Accumulating proportionate difficulties would arise and inevitably mar our purpose under procrastination. To forbear or procrastinate with rebels avowedly

bent on our extermination from India, would be to encourage a spirit of revolution for that of rebellion. We should by delay give confidence and daring to those, who already think we are afraid of dealing with the vast empire we have conquered, and incompetent and incapable of holding it. Delay with traitors can have no other interpretation. The punishment of revolt can never be a question of time. England should at once rouse in her throne of empire, and sweep to the vindication of her power, and the punishment of those who dispute it.

Connected with the calamity of the Indian rebellion, there are considerations, which, while estimating the adequate military force of England, should not be lost sight of.

It occurred at a time, when the political state of Europe admitted of our sending the main body of the English army to India. Under different circumstances, we could not have done so, nor must we ever again tempt fate or fortune by reducing our military power so low as to be compelled to leave England destitute of troops, or otherwise see our dependencies and outposts fall from our dominion from our want of power to defend them.

Already within the brief space of a year, we are warned to keep our house in order. There are clouds on the political horizon of Europe—

and those above the dimensions of a human hand, and all more threatening with storm than those which so suddenly forced us into our last war.

England will never shrink from looking dangers in the face. It is her fault that she too unthinkingly defies them; but let us not treat with indifference the chances that may interrupt peace.

Our present state of peace is not the more secure from its having come on us prematurely at a time when we had but half accomplished the objects of the war.

England, as usual, destitute of all necessary means of meeting sudden war, after a lapse of two years, formed an army capable of taking the field, and was beginning to breathe and feel her power, when suddenly our splendid efforts and vast sacrifices were rendered abortive, and our promising career abruptly checked by a peace of policy. England could not be expected to fight the battles of Europe single handed; and peace was made without our great enemy being vanquished. Indeed, that enemy at the close of the war virtually remained as formidable, if not as powerful, as at its outset. It will prove so. The peace effected was an absolute boon on our part, a peace of policy, not of necessity. A peace of views to ulterior aggrandisement of power, on

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the principle of a maxim known in war—"Il faut retirer pour mieux sauter."

The army of England can never become efficient as an army, or adequate to the requirements of the nation, till it is emancipated from the ever-shifting baneful influences of political party strife, and this is a consummation depending wholly and solely on the House of Commons. I have endeavoured on a former occasion to show the necessity of legislative military responsibility. We shall never have an army, Gentlemen, till that legislative responsibility is established. It must ever rest with you to decide on the time and means of establishing that responsibility. It calls for no legislative enactment, the simple practical course would be a conventional understanding among all classes and shades of political party, to the end that all military affairs of the nation should be entertained and legislated on as "open questions." That course, Gentlemen, would involve no compromise in independent voting, while it would be at once the most consistent with the dignity of the House and the responsibility of the executive Government of the State.

An understanding of this nature would also dispel the injurious prejudices awakened by making "military retrenchment" a pass word to hustings favour.

With a view to extend our commerce we have by conquest, annexation, or colonization, spread our empire to every part of the globe. "Military retrenchment!" We sound our own knell, Gentlemen, when we call for military retrenchment. What would become of England's commercial wealth without her army? In less than a century it would become the prey of nations which know well and calculate on the uses and necessity of military power.

The House of Commons are not and can never be satisfied with the adequacy or efficiency of the army under the absence of a legislative military responsibility. Witness their expressed disapprobation at our want of men and material at the commencement of all wars, and the prodigal accumulation of material—useless at their close. And yet these evils are the results of a system, which it rests exclusively with the House of Commons to correct. The House of Commons express indignant feeling when privation or discomfort are exposed as prevailing in the army. The grounds of those complaints have their rise in our call for economy and irresponsible system. The legislative restriction of the House of Commons pervades and is felt in all details and branches of the service.

The causes of the unhealthiness of the army, now occupying public attention, from

whence have they their source? Not from neglect of representation of the want of barracks, but from positive denial of the means to build them; and not only were those means denied, but I remember remonstrance being made in the House of Commons even to the maintenance in repair of those erected.

In the same way as regards the want of means of cooking for the troops—another instance of legislative restriction deserving your notice, Gentlemen.

When I assumed the government of Gibraltar in 1849, the troops had lived on boiled meat from the day of its conquest. I made application for ovens to enable the men occasionally to bake their meat. After a lapse of two years the estimate for the ovens passed the House of Commons, and the troops received the grant with great thankfulness, and certainly with advantage to their health. These are trifles, Gentlemen—but they illustrate our system.

The House of Commons have constitutional control over the expenses of the State. But if that control was to be exercised in an initiatory restriction, instead of a corrective form, it would assume a character fatal, instead of beneficial to the country—and indeed as the world goes, would end in paralyzing the energies and usefulness of its military power.

It may be asked, "How are the House of Commons to exercise that control over the military expenditure of the country, with which they are constitutionally entrusted?"

Very easily, Gentlemen. If the executive Government abuse the power, or fail in the responsibility with which they are, in like manner with the House of Commons, constitutionally entrusted, impeach them. The Throne is always open to your appeal, and you certainly would never again be called on to resort to so extreme an exercise of your legislative restrictive power.

It will occur to you, Gentlemen, as a problem which demonstrates itself, that for the security of England, from whence you have sent your army to reconquer India, you must augment your force to the amount thus remotely disposed of.

February 16. While I was preparing these observations, I learnt the amount of increase to our army by the printed estimates—3,000 men!

We augment by hundreds, gentlemen, where we should deal in thousands; 30,000 instead of 3,000, would not answer the requirements of the home service, and foreign dependencies of England. It is a startling number, but the necessity of such increase is no less certain, than it is that we shall rue the want of those numbers if we fail in providing them.

It was not my purpose to enter into nume-

rical details in this address; but there is one military point of such essential necessity to be borne in mind by every member of the House of Commons, that it cannot be too frequently urged and adverted to. I allude to the recruiting branch of the service, which will now become one of most anxious thought to the Minister for War—and certainly one of the most arduous and unremitting labours of the Commander-in-Chief. And this branch of our military service, Gentlemen, calls with absolute necessity for a fixed designated system—a system framed on a calculation of the known casualties of the service from deaths, sickness, discharge, and the ordinary contingent causes of an extensive active service. The system of our recruitment, which will scarcely meet its requirements for affording a continuous flow of re-enforcements to our Indian army, without the active intervention of the House of Commons among the constituencies of the country, must be made known throughout the length and breadth of the United Empire. Recruits adequate to our increased requirements, cannot be voluntarily procured without a system circulated through the country, and *understood*. It is not to be expected that men will quit their occupations at the plough or the loom on a sudden invitation to enlistment for however short a service—subject

to a reduced provision for the maintenance of their family.

The Indian rebellion will awaken us to a conviction which the wars of Europe have never yet done. It is, that the military exigencies of England can never, from this time forth, be adequately met by temporary measures. We must come to the resolution of acting on responsible system, and be at all times prepared for the magnitude of events and requirements which have grown with the increase of our remote dependencies. A temporary army can never be perfect. We cannot put down an army one day and take it up the next. In agriculture or mercantile affairs can we suspend or neglect our occupations and resume them without loss of science and practical ability? How much more fatally must such suspension affect military efficiency, the very soul of which consists in uninterrupted routine of system, interior economy, unrelaxed discipline, with the sustained pursuit of all higher practical acquirements that can advance the name and efficiency of the service.

Complaints, I know, are made that "enough" is not gained for the sums yearly voted by the "House of Commons for the military service of the country."

There is a negative truth in that. But that evil also, Gentlemen, has its rise in the legis-

lative influence of the House of Commons, which utterly precludes the attainment or maintenance of system, by which alone we can touch responsibility. But, as in the ordinary affairs of life, what is everybody's duty is nobody's duty ; and the House of Commons being a legislative and not an executive body, and withal a branch of the state of periodical elective change, System, interrupted in the executive Government, is lost sight of, and the sums annually voted by the House of Commons consequently expended without adequate supervision of responsibility.

It is a natural result of causes, Gentlemen, that it should be so.

If the House of Commons, nearly 700 in number, were composed exclusively of military men, they could neither legislate successfully or beneficially for the construction, training, or maintained organization of the army, nor for the efficiency of its component branches. There would still be conflict of opinions among such vast numbers. But what must the nature of influence be of nearly seven hundred opinions, for the greater part wholly uninformed on military requirements or purposes ?

Disregard of military power has at times been openly professed and carried to great lengths by members of the House of Commons. Even the invasion and occupation of England by an

enemy has been represented as an evil of little import! Surely to think thus would be to “hug their own chains.” If England, under the spell of commercial wealth or dishonourable peace, could possibly become passive to the ignominious yoke of a victor, she would soon be roused from her golden dream by a peremptory demand of payment of a “first instalment” of a contingent levied to defray the equipment of the invading armament, and pay, quartering, clothing, and rations of the troops holding local possession in the country.

A well-known master of State Sophistry maintains that nations do not suffer by degradation, and that once being sunk and debased to the lowest state of vileness by luxury, avarice, vice, and folly, they necessarily again ascend to greatness in power, wealth, and military fame. Here are his words :—

Machiavelli,
Vicende alle
quali sono
sottoposti i
Governi.

“ Sogliono le provincie il più delle volte nel
“ variare, ch’elle fanno, dall’ ordine venire al
“ disordine, e di nuovo depoi dall’ disordine all’
“ ordine trapassare ; perchè non essendo dalla
“ natura conceduto alle mondane cose il fermarsi,
“ come elle arrivano alle loro ultimo perfezione,
“ non avendo più da salire, conviene che scen-
“ dino, e similmente scese che lo sono, e per gli
“ disordini ad ultima bassezza pervenute, di
“ necessità non potendo più scendere, conviene

H

“ che salghino, e così sempre dal bene si scende
 “ al male, e del male si sale al bene. Perchè la
 “ virtù partorisce quiete, la quiete ozio, l'ozio
 “ disordine, il disordine rovina ; e similmente
 “ dalla rovina nasce l'ordine, dall' ordine virtù, da
 “ questa gloria e buona fortuna.”

Like many of this State philosopher's maxims, this is more plausible than true. There is no record of a nation, once fallen in military power, wealth, and greatness, ever again recovering its ascendancy in the world.

England as yet knows nothing of the horrors of an enemy's possession of her homes and soil, and they may unthoughtfully and unwisely be contemned. But let us be warned in time : a few of us still live who can bear testimony to the truth, that there is no state of national degradation or suffering equal to that caused by the excesses of an invading army. The military power of England is not what her safety calls for, either in its numerical force or its defences. This is England's military state ; while we calmly regard the indefatigable efforts of other nations, not only in their home defences, but in augmenting the means of aggressive power. Again I venture to say, Gentlemen, take these truths to thought and to heart—and, assume and maintain for England, under guard of your legislative authority, an enduring power and com-

manding position among the military nations of the world.

Before finally closing these observations, Gentlemen, I am anxious to submit to you, as on past occasions, the expression of that respect which I feel and owe to your high legislative position and authority ; and further, to add my earnest request, that if, in the discharge of what I have deemed a professional duty, and which, from the important interests it refers to, I can but be aware must be regarded in many and various views—if, in the attempted fulfilment of this duty, I have erred or departed from those forms prescribed in addressing your honourable House, I earnestly beg your indulgence and pardon, and that you will believe me as incapable of consciously forfeiting what claim I may venture to entertain to your attention, as I hope you will believe me to be impelled by one sole object—the permanent adequacy and perfection of the military power of England.

I have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,

With profound respect,

Your most humble and obedient servant,

ROBERT GARDINER.

March 5th, 1858.

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